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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the efficiency of capitalistic and cooperative firms by fo-
cusing on the workers’ effort in production activity, when this effort is only known to workers, 
thus causing information asymmetries between workers and managers of both types of firms. 
Therefore, our model uses a principal-agents framework with workers’ hidden actions. The agen-
cy relations are not centered on the optimal design of incentive mechanisms but on the efficient 
(albeit incomplete) managerial monitoring of workers’ private effort. Moreover there is a trade- 
off between this monitoring activity and another managerial activity, i.e. the organization of pro-
duction processes. We show that, taking into account the information asymmetries that charac-
terize our model, the cooperative firm requires less monitoring than the capitalist firm to achieve 
the same efficient level of workers’ effort. This allows the manager of the former firm to devote 
more working time to organizational activity than the manager of the latter firm. In this respect, 
the governance of the cooperative firm dominates that of the capitalist firm. However, both types 
of firms need capital to operate and face different financial constraints in terms of the capital’s 
purchasing cost. These financial constraints affect the cooperative firm more severely than the ca-
pitalistic firm. Our conclusion is that these two types of firms have specific strengths and weak-
nesses, which make it difficult to reach general analytical results in terms of their relative effi-
ciency. Additionally, the financial constraints characterizing the cooperative firm hinder maximi-
zation of its long-term growth rate; on the other hand, this kind of firm can better exploit the vir-
tuous circle between increases in the employment level and increases in the growth rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperative firms have played and continue to play a major role in the world economy. Their members, both 
workers and consumers, amount to over a billion people.1 In the past thirty years, the economic literature has 
devoted increasing attention to cooperative firms. However, quite surprisingly, the theoretical and empirical 
analyses of this important component of the world economy have been progressively confined to significant but 
very specific areas, such as worker productivity and access constraints to financial capital (see, for instance, 
[1]-[5]). As a result, the cooperative sector, although it has been studied by many great economists in the past 
(see [6]-[8]), has almost disappeared from current micro and macroeconomics textbooks [9]. 
One of the most detrimental effects of this approach has been the disappearance in recent economic theory of 
an analysis that emerged in the late 1950s [10] and developed during the 1970s and 1980s: the comparison be-
tween cooperative and capitalist firms in terms of organization and their respective degree of efficiency.2 Al-
though that comparison achieved no general and definitive conclusions, by the end of the 1980s, economic 
analysis had focused only on the capitalist model. As a consequence, all the progress made in microeconomic 
theory around those years [22]-[25] and the related criticism leveled at the neo-Walrasian program were applied 
more to the capitalist firm than to the cooperative. In this respect, it is quite instructive to refer to the literature 
on agency costs and market failures based on imperfect or asymmetric information [26]-[30]. Some authors have 
sought to use this literature to re-propose a comparison between capitalist and cooperative firms in terms of effi-
ciency.3 Despite that, the very focus of the different models on agency costs and imperfect or asymmetric infor-
mation has continued to be confined to the capitalist firm. 
This outcome represents a missed opportunity. Attention to agency costs and market failures put the focus 
back on Coase’s framework [38] and gave a solid analytical basis to Williamson's neo-institutionalist approach 
[39]-[41]. The consequent definition of the firm as a complex organization characterized by the internalization 
of a set of contractual nexus and their subordination to hierarchical relations (principle of authority) made the 
concepts of property rights and governance crucial. This offered a stronger theoretical justification for the coex-
istence of different kinds of firms in the market. A brief references to analytical steps that connect agency mod-
els to property rights and firms’ governance will be useful to clarify this point.  
The presence of “incomplete contracts” and the designation of the firm as a “collection of physical activities” 
that represent the main components of the Hart-Moore [42] [43] models imply that the problem of attributing the 
residual rights of control is difficult to solve. Allocation of these rights in the form of property rights, which le-
gitimize their holders to determine the utilization of non-human activities in all situations not regulated ex ante 
by contracts and to get residual income, is efficient if it rewards the type of agents that carry out the “indispens-
able” function in the firm.4 However, according to Hansmann’s analysis [32], the attribution of property rights to 
“indispensable agents” minimizes agency costs only if these agents have the highest negotiation costs on the 
market. In any event, property rights introduce a non-contractual principle, which requires regulation with re-
gard to the management of residual rights of control. In the definition of Rajan and Zingales [44]-[47], a firm’s 
governance is precisely that complex system of (self)regulation that places constraints upon owners’ decisions 
and especially upon their ex post appropriation of residual income.5 Furthermore, compared to Hart and Moore 
[43], Rajan and Zingales attach more importance to the neo-institutionalist concept of “specific investment”. 
Thus, the firm becomes a combination of activities and specialized agents, and appropriation of residual income 
depends on agents who made the most specific, and therefore riskiest, investments.  
In this context, governance can be defined as the system of rules and constraints that shapes firm’s activities 
 
 
1According to a Report issued by the International Co-operative Alliance “Global 300”, in 2013, the 300 largest cooperatives in the world 
produced a value added equal to 2360 billion dollars, which is the equivalent of the yearly GDP of the eighth largest economic system in the 
international market.  
2See, for example [11]-[20]. For an extended in-depth review, see [21].  
3See, for instance [31]-[35]. In this respect, the most important contribution is offered by [36] and [37].  
4Hart and Moore ([43], p. 1133) define “indispensable” for a given activity the agent whose absence would render irrelevant the contribution 
of this same activity to the “marginal product of the investment” for the whole set of agents entering the contract.  
5In the literature, we now have a large number of definitions of corporate governance. In descriptive terms, however, we can state that go-
vernance regulates a subset of relations between different groups of agents who hold specific interests in a given firm or company (stake-
holders, obviously besides shareholders). Referring to fields usually regulated neither by primary norms nor by contractual agreements, go-
vernance is a form of (self)regulation that assesses the temporary power equilibria between different interest groups. Thus, the fields in 
which governance can apply vary from the relations between shareholders and management to the working of boards of directors and of 
firms’ control bodies, from self-regulation codes towards sellers and consumers to aspects concerning workers’ protection and involvement.  
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which are not guaranteed by external rules and contracts (i.e. contracts are incomplete). Such rules and con-
straints refer to decisions and ex ante negotiations as well as to monitoring and ex post distribution of the net 
income (cf. [46]). Hence, agency relationships and governance offer powerful analytical tools to revisit, on a 
more modern theoretical basis, the comparison between cooperative and capitalist firms in terms of their respec-
tive degree of efficiency. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a comparison between these two kinds of firms by focusing on work-
ers’ effort during the productive activity in a model where owners and/or managers suffer from information 
asymmetries. In the part dedicated to the cooperative firm (limited here to a cooperative of “production and 
work”; cf. infra), this comparison is interlaced with the assessment of costs and opportunities connected with the 
participation of workers in the firm’s capital. In our model, agency relations do not mainly pertain to the design 
of incentive mechanisms but rather the setting of an efficient form of monitoring, centered on management con-
trol (albeit incomplete) of workers’ effort during production. What emerges is that acquisition of ownership 
shares by each worker in the cooperative firm can reduce the efficient level of monitoring worker activity and 
increase the financing costs of productive capital. We conclude that, compared with the capitalist firm, the co-
operative firm has efficiency advantages in terms of organizational activity but shows inefficiencies in capital 
acquisition. 
To prove this conclusion, we first examine the objective functions of the two different firms (capitalist and 
cooperative) and specify the main assumptions characterizing the model (Section 2). It thus becomes possible to 
specify the problem of optimization in the capitalist firm with respect to the amount of managerial monitoring of 
worker activity as well as to the employment level (Section 3), and the analogous problem of optimization in the 
cooperative firm with respect to the amount of managerial monitoring and to the share of firm profits allocated 
to reserves (Section 4). The equilibrium conditions, which depend on the solution of these two problems of con-
strained maximization, provide a new approach to comparing the efficiency of these two types of firms.  
This comparison leads to the result specified above: it does not allow us to establish whether the governance 
and organization of one of the two firms are more or less efficient with respect to those of the other (Section 5). 
As will be discussed in Section 6, to achieve a more precise overall result, we would need to extend our model 
to analyze the financial aspects of the two firms. However, the formalization of this extended model would re-
quire complex descriptive and analytical work exceeding the limits of this paper. It will then be sufficient to 
show that the results achieved, albeit still not a solution, are interesting and lead to a number of more immediate 
extensions of our model. 
2. Framework 
As suggested in the Introduction, the main differences between capitalist and cooperative firms can be stated by 
different forms of ownership and governance. Furthermore, since the 1990s, the economic literature has shown 
that different types of ownership and governance lead to different forms of corporate organization and control 
[32] [44] [48]-[50]. Therefore, our two objectives are to describe the specific forms through which capitalist and 
cooperative firms seek to attain optimal levels of organization and control with respect to their production 
processes and to define a relative measure of the efficiency achieved by these two firms with respect to such 
processes. 
Besides reducing the two kinds of firms to a representative capitalist firm and a representative cooperative 
firm, our model makes the following assumptions: 
1) no separation between firm ownership and firm management, so the capitalistic firm is an entrepreneurial 
firm and the cooperative firm is an organization of “production and work”; 
2) the two types of firms, which operate in a market economy and are in competition, have the same technical 
production function and produce the same good; 
3) the capitalist firm pursues the objective of maximizing its expected profits in the short term, while the co-
operative firm aims to guarantee stable employment and an adequate income for its members through the entire 
period of their working life, maximizing long-term growth; 
4) the owner of the capitalist firm holds the amount of capital required for the production process and can ei-
ther utilize or sell it, while the cooperative firm has to purchase capital on the market; 
5) workers’ compensation cannot be contingent on their effort since the latter is private information, and thus 
monetary wages are exogenously fixed at a set amount; 
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6) workers of both firms intend to maximize expected utility by supplying the lowest effort; 
7) the entrepreneur of the capitalist firm and the manager of the cooperative firm are endowed with a set 
amount of effort usable either for organizing and managing the firm or monitoring worker activity;  
8) worker effort is a stochastic increasing function of the managerial effort allocated to monitoring. 
Assumption 1) implies that we neglect the possible problems of control which depend on different “agency 
relations”, i.e. we put aside the problem of separation between firm ownership and management as well as the 
possible conflicts between majority and minority shareholders.6 The owner of our capitalist firm, who holds the 
residual rights of control over production outcomes, also acts as the manager: she is responsible for the firm’s 
organization and the management of worker activity. The capitalist firm is thus assimilated to the entrepreneuri-
al initiative. On the other hand, we bring the cooperative firm back to the “purest” form of mutuality—the or-
ganization of “production and work” in which all the workers are, pro quota, owners and collectively share the 
responsibility for their activities.7 To simplify the comparison with the capitalist firm, we assume that the man-
ager of the cooperative firm does not belong to the set of owner-workers. However, this does not imply a sepa-
ration between firm ownership and firm management since the owner-workers select the external manager on 
the basis of her acquired experience in the cooperative world and her adherence to cooperative principles. Hence, 
in the capitalist firm, there is an owner-manager (m = 1) and N workers and the only agency relation is between 
m and N; on the other hand, in the cooperative firm, there are N workers directly employed in the production 
process who are owners and who select an external pro tempore manager sharing cooperative objectives (m = 1). 
Assumption 2) above builds a benchmark case based on the temporary exclusion of the problems and costs 
related to the monitoring of workers’ activity. Thus the capitalist and cooperative firms have the same produc-
tion function. Each worker is endowed with a maximum capacity of effort ( 1ie = ; with 1, 2, ,i N=  ), and he 
receives a wage w which, in the benchmark case, corresponds to the maximum and optimal effort level ( i ie e= ). 
The stock of capital utilized in the production process by each firm is K.8 Therefore, in the benchmark case, the 
production function of the two firms is:  
*
iQ KN e KN
α α= =                                        (1) 
where 1ie = , 
*Q  is the optimal quantity produced under the hypothesis above, and α (with 0 < α < 1) is the 
technical coefficient associated with labor such that 
2
20, 0
Q Q
N N
∂ ∂
> <
∂ ∂
. 
Since both firms operate in a market economy and are in competition, they have to comply with factors of ef-
ficiency and competitiveness. Assumption 3) above implies that the capitalist firm satisfies these two constraints 
by pursuing the objective of maximizing its expected profits in the short term—that is, the difference between 
current revenues and costs. The same assumption implies, on the other hand, that a cooperative firm aims to 
 
 
6One of the early analyses of the various types of agency relations characterizing the firm is offered by Jensen and Meckling [26]. An agen-
cy relation is defined by a contract, according to which the individual entitled to set the terms of the contract and to offer these contractual 
terms on the market (that is, the “principal”) delegates to other individuals (that is, the “agents”) the implementation of activities which are 
crucial for the fulfillment of her objective function. The usual problem is that the “principal” has an incomplete or asymmetric set of infor-
mation, such that she is unable (a) to design and to offer a contract which includes all the possible future events, and (b) to exert a perfect 
and non-costly control on all the features and/or actions of the “agents”. Hence, in order to solve her maximization problem, the “principal” 
has to design suitable contractual terms to give the agents (who act in their own interests) the right incentives to self-select themselves or 
their possible actions according to her preferred ranking. Moreover, the “principal” can find it convenient to implement imperfect and costly 
monitoring of the activity actually performed by the “agents”. The costs, determined by the implementation of an ex ante and efficient in-
centive scheme, are termed agency costs; the costs, determined by the implementation of an imperfect ex post control, are termed monitoring 
costs. The relationships between shareholders and management typically lead to agency problems (see [48], [51], and [52]); and the same 
applies to the public company or other forms of collective ownership, where the agency problems characterize the relationships between  
majority and minority shareholders [53]-[57]. Another typical agency relation outside the firm is that between lenders and borrowers. The 
only agency relation inside the firm, analyzed in this paper, is that between management and workers.  
7There are three different categories of cooperatives, at least in Italy: workers’ cooperatives, users’ cooperatives, and services cooperatives. 
The cooperative firms of “production and work” (cooperative di produzione e lavoro) belong to the first category. We neglect the fact that, 
often in the real world, some workers are not members of the cooperative of “production and work”. From an analytical point of view, the 
workings of the different forms of cooperative firms in the three categories above can be reduced, directly or indirectly, with different de-
grees of approximation, to the workings of a cooperative of “production and work”. However, this general rule does not apply to consumers’ 
cooperatives or non-profit cooperatives. [58], [59], and [34] and [60] provide stimulating, but not conclusive, attempts to reduce the beha-
vior of these two latter types of cooperatives to a common analytical framework. The topic of this paper—a comparison between the capi-
talist and cooperative firm—justifies the exclusion of non-profit activities; here, we extend this exclusion to consumers’ cooperatives.  
8For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each firm completely consumes its available stock of capital in the current production process. 
Hence, we eliminate problems related to inventories and depreciation.  
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guarantee stable employment and an adequate income for its members throughout their working lives. Moreover, 
the cooperative firm aims for intergenerational fairness, often pursued by means of the “free entry” principle for 
new, young, and qualified members [2]. This complex set of objectives implies the realization of an optimal 
growth rate in the long term. For this reason, even at the risk of excessive simplification, we assume that the 
cooperative firm maximizes the share of its current profits set aside as an indivisible reserve, under the con-
straint of satisfying the mutuality principle by setting an amount of drawbacks commensurate with the different 
forms of contribution made by each single member.9 
The output of each of the two firms is the quantity (Q) of a given good, which is the only one produced in the 
economic system. The supply price of this good is normalized to 1. Given assumption 4) above, the two firms 
face different constraints for starting their specific production process. At first glance, the capitalist firm only 
incurs the direct labor costs (w N) since the entrepreneur (owner) already holds the required capital (K). The co-
operative firm, instead, has to purchase the amount of capital required for its production process on the market. 
As stated above, we assume here that each employee of the cooperative firm becomes an owner-member by 
buying a share (K/N of the capital K for a value equal to η ; where: Kp K Nη = , and pK (from here on, just p) 
denotes the general price level of capital goods. The sellers of capital K are rentiers—ad hoc agents whose stock 
of goods and behavior are exogenous variables in our model. In principle, the seller of K could also be the en-
trepreneur of the capitalist firm who would thus forgo producing a portion of its output Q in order to play the 
role of rentier as well. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore this possibility here. However, its mere existence 
indicates that the capitalist firm (and not only the cooperative firm) has to bear, in addition to the labor cost, the 
cost of capital (pK; see also footnote 8). In this respect, the cooperative firm incurs a direct cost of purchasing K 
on the market, while the capitalist firm incurs the “opportunity-cost” of its entrepreneur. Both these costs, which 
are equal, have to be included in the production costs.  
In the benchmark case analyzed here, i.e., when workers are independently controlled and thus supply their 
optimal effort without costly monitoring, the expected profit of each of the two firms is the same and equal to: 
( )* *
coopcap i
KN e wN pK KN wN pKα απ π= = − + = − −                     (2) 
At the end of the production process, the owner of the capitalist firm has the right to take possession of the 
whole amount of profit made by the firm; each owner-member of the cooperative firm, instead of the portion 
1/N of the realized profit, obtains only 1/N of the difference between this profit and the stocked reserve. 
In our model, the crucial problem is establishing whether (1) and (2) can be implemented when there is a 
standard problem of information asymmetry between owners and workers with respect to the effort supplied by 
the latter. In the literature, this kind of problem is solved by applying incentive schemes or imperfect monitoring 
schemes on worker activities (see, for instance, [23] [62]-[65]). Assumption 5) states that the monetary wage is 
exogenously fixed (with w < 1), i.e., it is determined independently of the actual effort supplied by workers. 
This means that there is no room for incentive schemes based on variable remunerations, and owners and/or 
managers have to resort to an imperfect monitoring scheme. 
The easiest way to introduce such a scheme is to maintain that, in both the firms in question, each worker ob-
tains a utility iU  (expressed in an additive form) directly from his activity. To comply with assumption 6), his 
utility is equal to the difference between the monetary wage and a monetary measure of his effort, since the lat-
 
 
9Italian legislation regulating the activity of cooperative firms has changed dramatically in the past twenty years. Nevertheless, there is still 
an obligation today to transfer at least 30% of profits to a reserve that cannot be liquidated to members even in the future (“indivisible re-
serve”). This obligation is compliant with the mutuality principle, which is a crucial ingredient of governance of cooperative firms (cf. infra, 
footnote 19). Here, we assume that the cooperative firm aims to maximize the share of profits assigned to reserves (from here on, assimi-
lated to the indivisible reserve), since this firm aims to keep growing in the long run. Therefore, as the legal rule of 30% does not represent a 
binding constraint from an economic point of view, it can be overlooked in the maximization problem of the cooperative firm (see below). 
Moreover, our model excludes all the agency problems between owners and managers by assumption, so we can neglect the possibility that 
managers pursue opportunistic behavior under the screen of objective functioning based on maximization of the reserve (cf. in this respect 
[61]). On the other hand, current Italian legislation has placed limits, albeit not as severe as in the past (see the so-called “new company 
law”), to the share and form of profits that the cooperative firm can assign to owner-workers and to the different types of capital-members. 
Our model only refers to owner-workers. In this respect, the quantitative limits are determined by the Italian Civil Code itself: the distribu-
tion of profits over the law’s threshold must be decided by the firm’s assembly and must take the form of a drawback—that is, it has to be a 
function of the intensity of the mutualistic relationship, which each member holds towards the cooperative firm, and does not have to be 
proportional to the amount of capital given by each member. Here, we do not refer to the legislative details. However, the drawback being a 
component of the mutuality principle, our attempt is to meet the substance of the legal rule by assuming that the share of the profits assigned 
to the owner-workers is one of the binding constraints of the maximization problem of the cooperative firm. 
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ter is equivalent to a disutility whose unit value is fixed by the coefficient ρ .10 For the moment, we only take 
into account the component of utility directly related to the working activity with respect to the cooperative firm. 
It follows that each worker, whose objective function is the maximization of his own expected utility, aims to 
supply the lowest effort, given that the entrepreneur of the capitalist firm and the manager of the cooperative 
firm are unable to directly measure and control the above-mentioned effort because of information asymmetries, 
and given that the monetary wage is exogenously fixed as we assumed above. Equation (3) represents a simple 
formalization of what was previously stated with respect to the representative worker i (with i = 1, 2,  , N):  
i i i iU w e U w eρ ρ= − > = −                                  (3) 
for each i ie e< ; with 0 1.ρ< <  
Equation (3) implies that, with asymmetric information and without a monitoring scheme, the limit would be 
0ie = : the lower the effort supplied with respect to the maximum level, the higher the utility of the worker and 
the lower his labor productivity. This prevents both firms from reaching the level of production and related prof-
its determined by Equations (1) and (2) in the case of symmetric information. The managers of the two firms 
thus find it worthwhile to use their resources to reduce the information asymmetries and to control (albeit im-
perfectly) the effort supplied by workers. In this respect, assumption 7) above implies that the entrepreneur of 
the capitalist firm and the manager of the cooperative firm have a given amount of effort (normalized to 1) at 
their disposal, usable either to manage and organize the firm ( me ) or to monitor the workers’ activity (1 me− ).
11 
Since the entrepreneur is the sole owner of the capitalist firm, hence the only one who benefits from the entire 
amount of profits, she does not need any specific incentive to supply her maximum effort. That said, we should 
also assume that the entrepreneur is compensated with a remuneration s (with s w≥ ) for her managerial activi-
ty. Here, we assume that s = 0 without any loss of generality and in order to emphasize the other differences 
from the benchmark case. An analogous assumption applies to the effort of the manager of the cooperative firm. 
Even if the cooperative manager does not share ownership of the firm with the workers and hence does not hold 
any portion of firm’s capital, her full adherence to cooperative principles aligns her interests to the long-term 
objectives of the cooperative firm by construction. Thus, the problem lies in allocating the same and maximum 
amount of effort available for both managers between organization and monitoring.  
The above considerations show that in (1), we established a relation between ie  (=1) and Q
*, under the im-
plicit assumption that the absence of information asymmetries implied 1me = . Instead, if we consider informa-
tion asymmetries, 1me =  would imply ( )1 0me− =  and hence 0ie =  and Q = 0. This means that, with in-
formation asymmetries, a share of the managerial effort must address the monitoring of workers (that is 1me < ). 
As a consequence, ceteris paribus, Equation (1) would generate Q < Q*, even if the monitoring effort of manag-
ers was fortuitously able to induce 1i ie e= = . Moreover, this monitoring effort is usually imperfect, such that 
i ie e<  and, a fortiori, Q < Q
*. In any event, under information asymmetries, assumption 8) above implies that 
the actual ie  depends on me . Therefore, Equation (1) becomes: 
i mQ KN e e
α=                                       (4) 
with 0 1me< < ; ( )1i me e e= − , 
where  
0i
m
e
e
∂
<
∂
; 
2
20, 0;
m m
Q Q
e e
∂ ∂
> <
∂ ∂
 
2
20, 0.
i i
Q Q
e e
∂ ∂
> <
∂ ∂
 
Equation (4) represents a sort of simplified version of the OR type production function (an “O-Ring function”) 
(see [66]; [67]), in which the effort of the single worker influences total output by a multiplicative rather than an 
additive operator. This means that total effort is a total product of the individual efforts instead of their summa-
tion. With respect to the original function OR, Equation (4) does not establish a total product between the efforts 
of the individual workers but rather between workers’ effort ( iNe ) and the share of the managerial effort ( me ) 
devoted to organization instead of monitoring. Hence, the optimal allocation of the managerial effort between 
 
 
10Let us recall that the price level of the single good produced is normalized to 1. We also emphasize that each of the employees of the co-
operative firm has a more complex utility function, which also includes an indirect utility as specified in Section 4.  
11Let us state that, in accordance with the literature, we will describe the managerial effort to manage and organize the firm as organizational 
effort.  
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me  and 1 me−  has to be determined. 
To simplify the solution of this problem, assumption 8) also states that ie  is a stochastic increasing function 
of the managerial effort allocated to monitoring. In particular, with δ  ( 0 1δ< < ) being the coefficient of the 
related linear function, we have:  
( ) ( ), ,1 1i m i m m i ie z e z eδ ′= − + −                             (5) 
with 
( )
0
1
i
m
e
e
∂
>
∂ −
; where ,m iz  is the probability that a higher monitoring effort by manager m increases the 
level of effort of worker i, where ie′  indicates the minimum threshold (>0) of the latter effort with a probability 
( ,1 m iz− ) of evading monitoring (with 
,
,0.5 1; 0
m i
m i
m
z
z
e
∂
< < <
∂
).12 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ie′  is constant and denote ( ),1 m i iM z e′= −  (with 0M →  when 
, 1m iz → ). Equation (5) can therefore be rewritten as follows:
 ( ), 1i m i me z e Mδ= − +                             (5bis) 
Equation (5bis) implies that the production function of the two firms, expressed by Equation (4), and the 
worker’s direct utility, expressed by Equation (3), can be respectively re-written as:  
( ), 1m i m mQ KN z e M eα δ = − +                            (6) 
( ), 1i m i mU w z e Mρ δ = − − +                            (7) 
with 
( )
2
20,  0;  0,  0.1
i i
m m mm
U UQ Q
e e ee
∂ ∂∂ ∂
> < > <
∂ ∂ ∂ −∂
 
3. Model: The Capitalist Firm 
Given the framework described in the previous section, it is possible to solve the maximization problems ex-
pressing the respective objective function of the two firms in question.  
We start from the capitalist firm reduced to an entrepreneurial initiative. It is assumed that this firm pursues 
maximization of its short-term expected profit, i.e., maximization of the difference between current revenue and 
current monetary cost. The available capital (K) is given and fully depreciated in a single production process; 
therefore, the technical coefficient of production is: k K N= . The maximization problem is then reduced to a 
dual choice: the number of labor units to be employed (with N ≤ Ns13) and the amount of managerial effort ( me ) 
to be allocated to the firm’s organization rather than to monitoring worker activity. We therefore have to find the 
values of N and me  that maximize the expected profits of the capitalist firm, given that the wage (w) is ex-
ogenously determined and under the constraint that the workers’ expected utility must be greater or at least equal 
to the reserve utility (fixed, for simplicity, at 014). In the case of the capitalist firm, the direct expected utility of 
each worker (see Equation (7)) coincides with his expected utility.15  
The constrained maximization problem is: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
,,
, ,
max 1
. . : 1 0
m
m i m mN e
i cap m i m
Q wN pK KN z e M e wN pK
s t U w z e M
α δ
ρ δ
 − + = − + − + 
 = − − + ≥ 
              (8) 
and the Lagrangian becomes: 
 
 
12In our model, the condition (0.5 < zm,i) is an assumption required to obtain economically significant results. However, it is reasonable to 
apply a kind of Shapley rule to the expected impact of imperfect monitoring.  
13Ns indicates the maximum amount of labor units available in our economic system at wage w. Strictly speaking, the condition N ≤ Ns 
would have to be incorporated as a constraint in the following maximization problem. In order to avoid a pointless complication, we assume 
that this constraint is always met as a strict inequality, that is, it is never binding.  
14It must be noted that such a simplification cannot be extended to the case of the cooperative firm.  
15This condition does not apply to the cooperative firm as well.  
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }, ,1 1m i m m m i mL KN z e M e wN pK w z e Mα δ λ ρ δ   = − + − + + − − +     
To find the optimal value of N and me , we need to build up a system of equations that express the first order 
conditions.16 One of the functions to be maximized relates to the amount of optimal managerial effort dedicated 
to firm organization:   
0
m
L
e
∂
=
∂
 
From this derivative, we obtain the value for the Lagrangian coefficient:  
, ,
,
2 m i m m i
m i
KN z e M KN z
z
α αδ δ
λ
ρ δ
− −
=                             (9) 
Another function to be maximized relates to the optimal choice concerning the amount of labor units (N): 
0L
N
∂
=
∂
. 
This derivative leads to: 
( )
1
1
, 1m i m mK z e M eN
w
αα δ −  − + =  
  
                         (10) 
The third and last first order condition relates to the maximization of L with respect to the coefficient λ , that 
is: 
0L
λ
∂
=
∂
 
From this derivative, we obtain the optimal value of the managerial effort to be allocated to firm organization 
rather than to monitoring workers: 
,
1m
m i
w Me
z
ρ
ρ δ
−
= −                                  (11) 
with , .m iw M zρ ρ δ− <  It is possible to offer an economic interpretation of the equilibrium conditions deriving from the solution of 
the constrained maximization problem. 
The first equilibrium Equation (10) determines the optimal level of employment in the capitalist firm as a 
function of labor productivity that, in turn, depends on the managerial effort devoted to firm organization and on 
monetary wage. Equation (10) can also be rewritten as: 
( )1 , 1 1m i m m
KN z e M e
w
αα δ−  − +  =                      (10bis) 
Equation (10bis) underlines that the optimal amount of labor units to be employed in a capitalist firm is the 
amount that equalizes the marginal revenue to the marginal cost. The marginal revenue is equal to the marginal  
productivity of labor ( ( )1 , 1m i m mKN z e M eαα δ−  − +  ), given the normalization to 1 of the price of the produced 
good; the marginal cost is equal to the unit cost of labor (w). 
The second equilibrium Equation (11) determines the optimal amount of managerial effort to be spent orga-
nizing the firm. This equation can also be written as:   
,
1 m
m i
w Me
z
ρ
ρ δ
−
− =                             (11bis) 
Equation (11bis) shows that the optimal amount of managerial effort to be spent monitoring workers depends 
 
 
16The concavity of the production function, specified in Equations (1) and (4) (see above), makes it unnecessary to determine the second or-
der conditions for the constrained solution of problem (8).  
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directly on the wage w and, inversely, on the following variables: the unit coefficient of the disutility associated 
to workers’ effort ( ρ ), the possibility of workers eluding the impact of managerial monitoring (M), the reaction 
parameter of workers’ effort to managerial monitoring itself (δ ), and the probability ( ,m iz ) that higher mana-
gerial monitoring effort could increase workers’ effort. 
The economic interpretation of the direct relationship between w and (1 me− ) becomes obvious if we consider 
that, in our model, the monetary wage is exogenously determined. Every exogenous increase of w implies great-
er managerial effort spent monitoring worker activity since the latter are called upon to offer a higher actual ef-
fort in order to compensate for their wage increase. It is also evident that an increase in the reaction parameter 
δ  or in the probability of a positive reaction by workers ,m iz  to managerial monitoring allows, ceteris paribus, 
acquisition of adequate worker effort with a lower managerial monitoring effort; for the owners, therefore, it 
becomes worthwhile to allocate more effort to the organization of the firm.  
The economic interpretation of the inverse relations between ρ  and (1 me− ) and between M and (1 me− ) is 
less evident. At the first sight, these relations should be direct and not inverse. If there is an increase in workers’ 
disutility at any given effort or if there is an increase in the probability of workers eluding the impact of moni-
toring beyond the minimum effort threshold, these same workers will have an incentive to decrease their effort 
at least up to this threshold. As a consequence, greater managerial monitoring effort would be needed in order to 
avoid inadequate levels of worker effort. However, both these relationships could derive from failures in the or-
ganization of the production activities and/or in monitoring; every increase in (1 me− ) reduces the managerial 
effort for the organization of the firm ( me ). It may thus be plausibly hypothesized that, if increases in (1 me− ) 
have a limited positive impact on ie  due to the high value of ρ  and/or M, reducing the managerial effort de-
voted to monitoring whenever there are further increases in workers’ disutility or in the probability of workers 
eluding the impact of monitoring could be worthwhile. Hence, there are two opposite tendencies relating ρ  
and M to (1 me− ). Equation (11bis) shows that the second tendency dominates the first. 
Equation (11) can be rewritten differently from (11bis) as:  
i
we
ρ
=                                   (11ter) 
Equation (11ter) suggests a much more intuitive economic interpretation than (11bis): it reproduces a typical 
condition of the theory of efficiency wages.17 The worker fixes his equilibrium effort in order to make it equal to 
the marginal increase in his utility (expressed by wage) and the marginal increase in the cost of the supplied ef-
fort (expressed by ρ ). 
Beyond their variations and their specific economic interpretation, the two equilibrium Equations (10) and (11) 
show an important basic element. In the capitalist firm examined, the entrepreneur incurs a cost to determine the 
optimal level of employment and the optimal amount of monitoring workers’ activity: in order to achieve this 
result, the entrepreneur has to limit the effort allocated to the organization of the firm, which would increase its 
output. Hence, the activity of the capitalist firm is actually compelled to a trade-off: given that the entrepreneur 
has an available amount of effort normalized to 1, this amount has to be divided between monitoring workers 
and organizing the firm. If the entrepreneur had been able to check on the workers’ effort without a costly mon-
itoring effort, these workers would have been forced to supply their maximum effort and the entrepreneur would 
have had the option to concentrate all effort on the firm’s organization. However, the presence of information 
asymmetries makes this hypothetical equilibrium (partly described by Equation (1), above) impossible to attain. 
Hence, the optimal equilibrium of N and me , described by Equations (10) and (11), is always dominated by the 
equilibrium that could be achieved in the absence of information asymmetries.  
Analysis of the activity of the cooperative firm, offered in the next section, aims to establish the cost of the 
trade-off described above and other possible costs incurred by this kind of firm. It will then be possible to com-
pare the relative efficiency of the two types of firms with respect to the monitoring of worker effort and mana-
gerial organizational effort, as well as other possible costs.18 
 
 
17This approach analyzes the positive but decreasing impact that wage increases have on the dynamics of labor productivity, and it shows 
that the minimization of the labor cost per unit of output is achieved at levels of w between a minimum and maximum level (cf. [68]). So-
low’s results have been refined and extended thanks to the examination of the possible links between efficiency wages and adverse selection 
mechanisms (cf. [69]) or moral hazard mechanisms (cf. [70]). Here, it is sufficient to note that, according to this approach, firms do not aim 
to minimize the level of w but find it convenient to increase wages up to the level coinciding with the minimum labor cost per unit of output. 
18The comparison will be made in Section 5. 
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4. Model: The Cooperative Firm  
To complete the analysis of the variables determining the workers’ choice of effort in the cooperative firm, three 
new factors have to be introduced. 
The first factor was partly examined in Section 2. To become an owner-member of the cooperative firm, each 
worker has to buy a share of the capital on the market, i.e., K N , with a value equal to η (with pK Nη = , 
where p is the general price level of the capital goods). To simplify the following formalization, we consider 
P pK≡  such that P Nη = . As we stated above, the total cost of the purchase of K (i.e., P) represents one of 
the production costs of the cooperative firm, so it enters the profits’ function (see Equations (2), (4) and (5) 
above): 
( ), 1coop m i m mKN z e M e wN Pαπ δ = − + − −   
On the other hand, having been borne by each worker of the firm, this cost can also represent a cost-opportu- 
nity for the workers themselves. In this respect, let us assume that there is an alternative allocation of η able to 
assure a riskless rate of return equal to r. The utility function of the single worker of the cooperative firm must 
then have a value at least equal to that of the reserve utility iU  fixed by the alternative return r:  
,i coop
K PU rp r
N N
= ≡                                    (12) 
with 0 < r < 1. 
The second factor is based on another aspect that we have highlighted several times: in the cooperative firm, 
workers are also owners, so they take possession of the distributed profits. Nevertheless, we have to remember 
that this kind of firm is characterized by the mutuality principle, and a fundamental component of this principle 
is based on the fact that the cooperative firm allocates most of its realized profits to a reserve fund and then the 
residue to drawbacks.19 Indeed, since the cooperative firm has the objective of fulfilling optimal long-term 
growth, it aims to maximize the share of its profits assigned to the reserve fund, under the constraint of assuring 
drawbacks compatible with the utility function of their worker-members. Let φ  be the share of profits assigned 
to the reserve (where: 0 1φ< ≤ ); the remaining part of these profits, distributed between the worker-members 
of the cooperative firm in the form of drawbacks, is then equal to (1 φ− ). It follows that, for the cooperative firm, 
φ  is to be added to me  as the choice variable.
20 On the other hand, the expected utility function of each work-
er-member is no longer reducible to his direct utility (see Equation (7), above) but has to be integrated with 
his share of profits ( )1 coop
N
π
φ− . In a first approximation, we would then have: 
( ) ( ) ( )1, , ,1 1 1i coop m i m m i m m
PU w z e M KN z e M e w
N
αρ δ φ δ−     = − − + + − − + − +        
 
Not even the previous expression represents the complete form of the expected utility function of each worker 
of the cooperative firm. Indeed, this expression has to be integrated with another component of the mutuality 
principle that has been treated by Sen [71] in terms of “social consciousness”. “Social consciousness” has been 
disregarded in the representation of the cooperative firm, with rare exceptions (for instance: [72]; [66]), even 
 
 
19The mutuality principle represents the crucial feature of cooperative governance. This principle is based on at least four elements: (i) the 
rule of “one head, one vote”, (ii) limits to the remuneration of the share of capital possibly contributed by non-worker-members, (iii) the 
choice and constraints to attributing a significant share of the yearly profits (net of the remuneration of the ordinary capital) to reserves, and 
(iv) the choice of transforming the share of the remaining net profits into drawbacks for members. Here, we assume that the total amount of 
capital was given by workers, so there is no problem of remuneration of the ordinary capital. We also assume that, beyond legal obligations, 
the mutuality principle latosensu can be reduced to element (iii) and to the consequent indivisibility of the cooperative firm’s reserves. The 
allocation of a significant portion of profits to reserve and the indivisibility of the latter introduce the distinction between maximization of 
profits acquired by the owners (maximization of the “subjective gain”), which cannot be dominant in the governance of the cooperative firm, 
and maximization of the firm’s growth (maximization of the “objective gain”), which is a pivotal point of this governance since it gives sub-
stance to the long-term guideline.  
20In comparison with the maximization problem of the capitalist firm, we thus find that φ  replaces N. If we refer to the tradition initiated 
by Ward [10], it may appear appalling that the cooperative firm does not include the employment level between its choice variables. The 
point is that, in our model, we list the short-term employment level among the exogenous variables. This level coincides with the number of 
worker-members; it would be analytically too complex to consider the number of worker-members as an endogenous variable. By contrast, 
the long-term employment level is indirectly included in the choice variables of the cooperative firm, since it is approximated by φ  itself 
(cf. above, Section 2). Moreover, as will become clear, N indirectly enters the utility function of workers of the cooperative firm.  
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though cooperative firms have an ownership structure and an organization that incentivize solidarity among 
workers.21 In our model, we can refer to the concept of “social consciousness” by assuming that the utility and, 
hence, the effort of the single worker also depends on the utility obtained by the other workers of the coopera-
tive firm. This means that the utility of each member, beyond being a direct function of the wage received and of 
the distributed profits and drawbacks, as well as an inverse function of the effort supplied, is also positively in-
fluenced by the utility accomplished by the other workers of the cooperative firm thanks to their productive ac-
tivity. 0γ  indicates the coefficient evaluating that positive influence. Henceforth, 0γ  will be termed the “so-
cial consciousness” coefficient. Furthermore, all the workers of the cooperative firm receive the same wage, 
exogenously fixed, and the same share of profits. The expected utility of the single worker of the cooperative 
firm then becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , 0 ,1 1 1 1coopi coop m i m m i mU w z e M N w z e MN
π
ρ δ φ γ ρ δ   = − − + + − + − − − +        (13) 
with 00 1.γ< <  
Equation (13) can be rewritten as: 
( ){ } ( ) ( )1, , ,1 1 1i coop m i m m i m m pKU w z e M KN z e M e w N
αγ ρ δ φ δ−     = − − + + − − + − +        
  (14) 
with ( )01 1Nγ γ= + − . 
Equation (14) is based on the fact that γ  also depends on the employment level. From an economic point of 
view, this implies that the utility of worker-owners of the cooperative firm is also a direct function of the num-
ber of its employees. “Social consciousness” ( 0γ ) and the other elements of the expected utility function being 
equal, each of the worker-owners of a cooperative obtains greater utility if his firm has a higher employment 
level. In this sense, the objective of the cooperative to optimize its own long-term growth can also be interpreted 
as the goal of maintaining high levels of employment in the long term (see also footnote 20). 
Given these considerations, the problem of the constrained maximization problem of the cooperative firm is 
given by: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ } ( ) ( )
,,
1
, , ,
max 1
. . : 1 1 1
m
m i m me
i coop m i m m i m m
KN z e M e wN pK
K Ps t U w z e M KN z e M e w p r
N N
α
φ
α
φ δ
γ ρ δ φ δ−
 − + − + 
     = − − + + − − + − + ≥        
 (15) 
where: 1γ >  and ,0 , , , , , 1.m m ie w zδ ρ φ< ≤  Therefore, the Lagrangian function is: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ } ( ) ( )
,
1
, ,
1
1 1 1
m i m m
m i m m i m m
L KN z e M e wN pK
pK Pw z e M KN z e M e w r
N N
α
α
φ δ
λ γ ρ δ φ δ−
 = − + − + 
      + − − + + − − + − + −             
One of the first order conditions concerns the maximization of L with respect to the reserve to be stored: 
0L
φ
∂
=
∂  
It follows that the value of the Lagrangian coefficient is: 
Nλ =                                       (16) 
Offering formal confirmation of what is already realized by φ  and Equation (14), Equation (16) proves that 
employment level remains a crucial factor in the operating of the cooperative firm for our model as well. Indeed, 
 
 
21In Sen’s model [71], the agents are represented by “households”. Each household not only maximizes its utility (calculated by labor in-
come and free time), but also includes the utility of other households in its preferences. This “social consciousness” (S), which is defined in 
the interval [0 – 1], affects workers’ effort. In particular, if S is equal to 1, i.e., if each household considers the utility of other households as 
important as its own, worker effort will reach the optimal level independent of income distribution. On the contrary, if S becomes less than 1  
i.e., if each household considers its utility more valuable than that of other households, workers’ effort will reach a suboptimal level. Sen’s 
analysis has been used in some papers devoted to the analysis of the workings of the Israeli Kibbutz [73] [74].  
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if considered in the short term as an exogenous variable, N represents a constraint on the indirect utility that each 
worker of the cooperative firm gains through the utility of other worker-members; furthermore, in the long term, 
N is approximated by one of the choice variables (φ ). 
Once the value of the Lagrangian coefficient is determined, we can specify a second condition of the first or-
der by maximizing L with respect to the amount of management effort allocated to the organization of the coop-
erative firm ( me ):  
0
m
L
e
∂
=
∂
 
Given Equation (16), we determine the optimal level of me : 
( )1 , ,
,2
m i m i
m
m i
N z K M z
e
Kz
αγρ δ δ
δ
− + +
=                          (17) 
The last first order condition concerns the derivative of L with respect to the Lagrangian coefficient λ : 
0L
λ
∂
=
∂  
It follows that the optimal value for the profits share to be stored as reserve is: 
( ){ } ( )
( )
1
, ,
1
,
1 1
1
m i m m i m m
m i m m
P Pw z e M KN z e M e w r
N N
PKN z e M e w
N
α
α
γ ρ δ δ
φ
δ
−
−
   − − + + − + − − −   
=
 − + − − 
       (18) 
Let A denote the profit obtained by the cooperative firm for each employee, B the monetary wage received by 
each worker net of the effort supplied, C the opportunity cost borne by the worker to become member of the 
firm. Then:  
( )
( ){ }
1
,
,
1 ,
1 ,
m i m m
m i m
PA KN z e M e w
N
B w z e M
PC r
N
α δ
γ ρ δ
−  = − + − − 
 = − − + 
=
 
It follows that Equation (18) can be rewritten as: 
( )1A B Cφ− + =                               (18bis) 
Equation (18bis) indicates that the cooperative firm finds it optimal to keep in reserve that share of the rea-
lized profits making the additional utility obtained by the owner-worker and his reserve utility equal.  
The solution of the constrained maximization problem of the cooperative firm thus leads to the determination 
of the two equilibrium Equations (17) and (18). The latter equations show that, as in the case of the entrepreneur 
in the capitalist firm, the worker-owners of the cooperative firm also face a trade-off in order to determine the 
optimal share of profits to be stored as reserve and the optimal level of monitoring effort to be allocated to 
worker activity. If worker effort had been equal to 1 even without monitoring, the manager of the cooperative 
firm would have maximized her organizational effort. However, the presence of information asymmetries makes 
this hypothetical equilibrium (partly described by Equation (1), before) unattainable. Hence, the manager 
pro-tempore is obliged to limit the effort allocated to organizing the firm in order to monitor the workers. This 
limitation has a negative impact on the productivity and output of the cooperative firm. Moreover, if work-
er-owners gave up their rights to take possession of a positive share of the profits, the cooperative firm would 
employ all its resources for long-term growth and employment. However, the opportunity cost borne by work-
er-owners to buy their individual share of capital does not allow this kind of equilibrium. Therefore, as owners, 
workers limit the firm’s potential for long-term growth by taking possession of profit shares in the form of 
drawbacks.   
As a result, the optimal equilibrium of φ  and me  described by Equations (17) and (18) is lower than what 
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would be achieved in the absence of information asymmetries with respect to the workers’ effort and in the ab-
sence of positive costs of becoming worker-members. 
5. Comparing the Two Kinds of Firms  
The analysis, developed in the two previous sections, shows that a comparison between the relative efficiency of 
the capitalist and cooperative firms in pursuing their specific objective functions does not lead to clear-cut re-
sults. In order to take a step forward, it may be useful to specify the influence exercised by some independent 
variables on the values of me  and φ  in the case of the cooperative firm and to make a comparison, where 
possible, between the obtained results and the case of the capitalist firm.  
Let us start from Equation (17), reproduced here with only a simple manipulation:22 
1
,
11
2 2 2m m i
N Me
K z
αγρ
δ
−
− = − −                           (17bis) 
Equation (17 bis) shows that, similar to what happens in the capitalist firm, in the cooperative firm the optim-
al amount of monitoring effort spent by the temporary manager has an inverse relation with the following va-
riables: the unitary coefficient of the monetary disutility related to the effort of workers ( ρ ); the probability of 
the same workers eluding managerial monitoring (M); the relations between this probability and, respectively, 
the reaction parameter of worker effort to monitoring (δ ) and the probability ( ,m iz ) that a higher monitoring ef-
fort increases worker effort; the parameter ( γ ), which is a direct function of the “social consciousness” ( 0γ ).
23 
These relations show that in the cooperative firm, as in the case of the capitalist firm, it is convenient to in-
crease the organizational effort of the manager and to consequently decrease her monitoring effort whenever the 
positive impact of (1 me− ) on ie  is low due to the high value assumed by ρ  and/or M.
24 Moreover, as in the 
case of the capitalist firm, the inverse relation between M and (1 me− ) is reinforced by the impact of δ  and 
,m iz  that, having a value between 0 and 1 and being placed as the denominator, increase the value of the relative 
ratio. However, Equation (17bis) shows that, in the cooperative firm, unlike what happens in the capitalist firm, 
the optimal amount of (1 me− ) does not depend on wages (w) but depends inversely on γ  (the parameter of 
“social consciousness”). In order to compare the resulting monitoring cost incurred by management to give 
workers incentive to perform at an effort level maximizing the objective function of the two kinds of firms, it is 
then necessary to concentrate on this difference. 
First of all, in the capitalist firm, (1 me− ) is a direct function of w. By contrast, in the cooperative firm in-
creases in the degree of altruism, which is a component of the utility function of the individual worker-owners, 
and is now expressed by parameter γ , involve a reduction of (1 me− ). It is easy to find an economic justifica-
tion for this inverse relation between parameter γ  and (1 me− ): the increase in utility that each worker gets 
from the rise in the utility of his workfellows, and hence from the rise in output produced by the cooperative 
firm, albeit at the cost of greater individual labor effort, pushes every worker to increase his effort and to react 
more positively to the monitoring effort made by the manager. This means that, compared to the capitalist firm, 
the parameter of “social consciousness” in the cooperative firm reduces the rise in monitoring effort, imposed by 
a given increase of w. The result is that, ceteris paribus, in the cooperative firm, the optimal level of managerial 
monitoring is lower than in the capitalist one.  
Another way to reach the same conclusion is by considering the parameter γ  in a perspective slightly dif-
ferent from the one suggested by Sen [71], but which is consistent with the assumption of interdependence of 
workers utilities in the cooperative firm. The ownership structure and the organization of this kind of firm make 
it convenient for the single worker to stimulate and control the efforts of his colleagues. It is a behavior long 
since studied in the economic literature and denominated “peer monitoring”.25 The informal and decentered na-
ture of this form of monitoring minimizes firm’s costs (cut down to 0 here), without affecting its efficiency. As a 
 
 
22Differently from Equation (17), in Equation (17bis), the dependent variable is represented by the managerial effort of monitoring instead of 
by the managerial effort of organizing the firm.  
23See also Equations (13) and (14). Moreover, it must be noted that γ  and 0γ  can be assimilated without any distortion in the analysis as 
long as the topic of employment is set aside.  
24In this respect, what has already been stated in relation to the capitalist firm remains valid (cf. above, Section 3).  
25This concept was used by [75] to analyze the workings of the credit market and by [76] to analyze those of the insurance market. Moreover  
[77] referred peer monitoring to firm organization. For further analysis of the papers that applied the concept of peer monitoring to the co-
operative firm, see [78].  
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consequence, in the presence of efficient “peer monitoring” and other things being equal, a lower managerial 
monitoring effort is sufficient to obtain an optimal effort by workers. The typical ownership structure of the co-
operative firm and the related utility function of its individual workers stimulate “peer monitoring”, further re-
ducing the optimal monitoring effort to be spent by the manager. Each worker, holding an ownership share of 
the cooperative firm, benefits from making the relative production process as efficient as possible; he thus has 
an incentive to prevent his colleagues from shirking and to develop solidarity with them.  
These results are reinforced by the fact that the cooperative firm does not need to take recourse in additional 
monitoring in the case of exogenous increases in employment. By contrast, Equation (17bis) shows an inverse 
relationship between N and the amount of monitoring; if the distinction between γ  and 0γ  is reintroduced 
(see footnote 23), Equation (14) displays a direct relation between N and γ . Both the equations thus show that, 
if the cooperative firm increases its employment, the amount of monitoring required by the manager in order to 
obtain optimal worker effort would decrease. The economic justification of this statement is a logical conse-
quence of the previous considerations (see Section 4): if N increases, ceteris paribus, there will also be an in-
crease in the utility of the single worker and/or stronger motivation to perform peer monitoring.  
Here, it is important to underline that the opposite holds true for the capitalist firm. As indicated in Equations 
(10) and (11bis) (see Section 3), an increase in w (the optimal level of working effort) implies an increase in the 
employment level as well as the required amount of managerial monitoring. In this case, as well, the economic 
justification is evident: if N increases, the entrepreneur will have greater difficulty controlling each worker’ ef-
forts and will have to increase her monitoring activity. However, the increase in N often comes with an increase 
in the organizational complexity of the capitalist firm. If this occurs, unlike the cooperative firm, the capitalist 
firm will pay for each increase in N with an increase in the cost of the trade-off, and the allocation of the mana-
gerial effort level between monitoring and organization becomes further sub-optimal.  
What we just stated leads to an important but partial conclusion. If comparison between the capitalist firm and 
the cooperative firm were limited to the problem of worker oversight, we would be able to give a clear-cut an-
swer to the question at the core of this paper: in a monitoring model of working activity, the cooperative firm 
pursues its objective function more efficiently than the capitalist firm. “Social consciousness”, i.e., solidarity 
among cooperative workers, explains this relative advantage. However, what has been disregarded until now is 
the other variable that the cooperative firm aims to maximize: the share of profits (φ ) stored in the indivisible 
reserve. To complete our analysis and the comparison with the capitalist firm, we thus have to examine the Equ-
ation (18bis), rewritten here as (18ter) by stressing the variable φ : 
1A B C B C
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A stands for the profits of the cooperative firm per worker, B the monetary wage collected by each worker net 
of the effort supplied, and C the opportunity cost borne by the worker to become member of the firm (with B < 
C).26 
The Equation (18ter) shows that the share of the stored profits is a direct function of the wage of each worker, 
net of the monetary value of the disutility deriving from the worker’s supplied effort, but an inverse function of 
the profits realized per worker and of the opportunity cost borne by workers to become members. Increases in 
the net wage raise the utility of each worker and erode the profits of the cooperative firm; the latter can, however, 
decrease the share (1 φ− ) of profits attributed to worker-owners in the form of drawbacks. On the other hand, to 
raise the amount of profits realized per worker, the firm in question has to increase productivity and, hence, the 
 
 
26The assumption (B < C) can be justified by considering that, in our model, each worker-member of the cooperative firm would not find the 
remuneration of that firm acceptable if his income were mainly based on wages. (B < C) indicates that the difference between the reserve 
utility of each worker-member of the cooperative firm and his wage income is compensated by distributed profits.  
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effort supplied by all the workers. It is then understandable that the workers would want to be compensated for 
their greater disutility with an increase of (1 φ− ). It is finally expected that, if each worker could obtain higher 
financial returns outside the firm, he will choose to become a member only if (1 φ− ) increases. 
 Equation (18ter) thus shows that, in the cooperative firm, there is always a trade-off between the degree of ef-
ficiency of the current production process and the maximization of long-term growth. Furthermore, this same 
equation emphasizes that, if potential worker-members have a better opportunity for risk-free investment in the 
financial market, it would be a further impediment to growth.27 The various problems originating from such 
constraints do not only directly limit the rate of growth of the cooperative firm in the long term, but they also 
weaken the possible virtuous circle between increases in the employment level and growth rate. It could be 
maintained that similar constraints also affect the capitalist firm. However, this does not hold in our model. By 
assumption, the entrepreneur has enough capital to generate every production process available to the firm. 
The comparison between the behavior of the capitalist firm and that of the cooperative firm in pursuing their 
specific objective functions is thus much less clear-cut than it appeared from Equation (17bis) alone. Indeed, our 
conclusion is that the relative efficiency of the two kinds of firm depends on whether monitoring costs prevail or 
not over financial costs.  
6. Financial Aspects and Extensions of the Model 
As previously stated, the advantages of the capitalist firm over the cooperative firm appear connected to the fi-
nancial resources for the purchase of capital K. In the real world, these advantages could be less effective than 
what emerges from our model. For instance, the operational mode of the Italian economy, which is concentrated 
on small and microfirms (which come close to the entrepreneurial organization we examined), has often been 
stigmatized as “capitalism without capital”.28 Financial constraints are set by the family wealth of entrepreneurs 
who are reluctant to share the control of their firms with non-relatives and to have recourse to the regulated cap-
ital market or even bond debt. Moreover, this kind of entrepreneur mistrusts external managers. It follows that 
small capitalist firm scan be drastically limited by financial constraints in developing successful activities and 
can be strongly dependent on the banking sector. On the other hand, some kinds of cooperative firms (most of 
all, consumer cooperatives) contract large amounts of stable low-cost debt (so stable as to come close to capital 
funding)—the members’ loans.29 Moreover, a number of large cooperative firms have access to bank loan con-
tracts that are not subject to more restrictive conditions than those offered to their capitalist competitors. That 
said, it remains true that capitalist firms normally use a wider spectrum of financial assets as regards cooperative 
firms.  
Our previous model cannot take into account these aspects since the workings of financial markets is left in 
the background. To reach a more conclusive comparison between the organization and governance of capitalist 
and cooperative firms, it would thus be necessary to incorporate the financial funding of the two different firms 
as an endogenous variable. However, this requires a preliminary solution to a still open problem in the economic 
and legal analysis of cooperative firms: compatibility between the mutuality principle, which is a constitutive 
and essential characteristic of this kind of firm, and access to new financial assets.30 Only by solving this prob-
lem would it be possible to combine the effort made by each worker of the cooperative firm to become one of 
the owners with the opportunities and management constraints to accessing different forms of funding. The 
consequent funding costs of the cooperative firm would then have to be compared with the corresponding cost 
of a capitalist firm willing to gain access to different financial instruments available on the market. 
As far as we know, analysis of the financial aspects of the cooperative firm is no closer to supplying us with 
 
 
27In our model, the cooperative firm does not have direct access to financial markets and, hence, does not obtain any advantage from the im-
proved efficiency of these markets. Our cooperative firm is financed solely by its members (see also Section 6).  
28The peculiar bank-oriented workings of the Italian financial market is reproduced through time by the limited amount of financing that the 
large majority of Italy’s small and very small firms and a significant part of its medium-sized firms obtain from financial sources other than 
self-financing and bank loans.  
29Members’ loans were initially classified as a form of risk capital and self-financing. Over time, changes in their regulation have, however, 
shown their true economic and legal nature: a form of debt, albeit incentivized and limited to the members. Here, it is impossible to address 
the problem in detail and point out the distortionary impact of members’ loans on the financial structure of cooperative firms. Being debt, 
members’ loans cannot solve the problems of undercapitalization, a typical feature of cooperative firms due to their problematic access to 
financial markets.  
30Recent legislation in Italy has allowed cooperative firms to access a number of financial resources. It is, however, worth pointing out that, 
on average, cooperative firms have made marginal use of such financial opportunities.  
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the answer we are looking for. Hence, rather than pursuing the goal of making the financial variables of cooper-
ative and capitalist firms endogenous, we propose some more limited extensions of our model here. 
First of all, even though it is the most analytically developed part, managerial monitoring can be further ex-
amined and extended. A first extension would be a more general formulation of firm monitoring and organiza-
tional costs as well as formalization of the related production functions. Then, with some modest algebraic ma-
nipulation, it would be possible to specify worker utility functions that are non-linear and take the workers’ de-
gree of risk aversion into consideration. It would also be beneficial to diminish the contrast between short-term 
objectives in the capitalist firm and long-term objectives in the cooperative firm, without overlooking the dis-
tinction between the two firms and the related comparison between their degree of efficiency. 
Secondly, the removal of some restrictive assumptions would permit a more elaborate representation of the 
organization of the cooperative firm. For example, specification of a more complex utility function of the repre-
sentative worker would be useful to introduce not only risk aversion, but also a type of worker who does not 
share ownership of the cooperative firm. It would then be possible to distinguish between the utility functions of 
worker-owners and worker-non-owners in the cooperative firm, and then to compare both functions with that of 
workers in the capitalist firm. Our expectation is for there to be fewer differences between the utility function of 
worker-non-owners in the cooperative firm and that of workers in the capitalist firm than between the utility 
function of the former and that of worker-owners in the same cooperative firm. Nevertheless, the governance of 
the cooperative firm would still differ from that of the capitalist firm, and it would be possible to better debate 
the benefits and costs related to workers’ participation.  
Thirdly, the organizational specification of the two different kinds of firms could be related to the different 
technology they adopt. At least in Italy, there is a low presence of cooperative firms at the technological frontier. 
This could be explained by the fact that the compared advantages of the cooperative firm are directly related to 
labor-intensive production processes, or it could stem from a different attitude toward risk on the part of capital-
ist entrepreneurs relative to worker-owners and cooperative managers.  
Fourthly, it would be possible to make a more radical change to the analytical structure of our model by in-
troducing the separation between ownership and management control in both types of firms. The capitalist firm 
would not be reduced to entrepreneurial activity, since it could take the form either of a firm with concentrated 
shares of ownership or of a public company (diffuse ownership). That said, in both these cases, the holder of 
property rights in the capitalist firm would be separate from the management. On the other hand, in the coopera-
tive firm, the identification of the manager as a supporter of cooperative principles would no longer be valid: as 
often happens in the real world, management would be constituted by managers hired on the market competing 
with capitalist firms. Hence, management of the cooperative firm would be similar to that of the capitalist firm. 
The main analytical impact of such changes would be that, in each kind of firm, there would no longer be only 
one agency relationship but several (see Section 1). To our knowledge, there is no well-formulated model of 
partial equilibrium comparing the efficiency of capitalist and cooperative firms by means of different agency re-
lationships within a unified framework.31  
Finally, an even more profound innovation would be the endogenization of the monetary wage that was 
treated as an exogenous variable in our model. If monetary wage were to become a dependent variable, we 
would not only have a simple model of monitoring but a model that would have to also specify optimal incentive 
schemes to face moral hazard (and hidden action). The optimal combination of the incentive design and moni-
toring scheme would already be a thorny problem in a unified model. In our setting, we would also have to re- 
phrase the comparison between the two different firms in this complex new model. 
7. Conclusions 
Our principal-agents model has dealt with the problems of monitoring worker activity and capital constraints in 
a capitalist firm and cooperative firm.  
From an analytical point of view, the part of the model dedicated to managerial monitoring of the working ac-
tivity is the most developed. It proves that, in the presence of information asymmetries about the actual effort 
 
 
31Let us just note that, if the firm can be defined as a nexus of contracts dominated by the authority principle (see above), the roles of “prin-
cipal” and “agents” become reversible and interchangeable. These roles would depend on the contract under examination. For instance, the 
holders of property rights play the role of “principals” in their relations with managers or workers, but they tend to play the role of “agents” 
in their relations with lenders. Moreover, a common label to indicate a given agency relation can hide very different problems in different 
firms.  
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provided by each worker, the cooperative firm requires less monitoring to achieve the optimal level of worker 
effort. Also being owners of the firm and thus able to choose the person responsible for management functions 
among insiders, cooperative workers develop relations based on solidarity and forms of “peer monitoring” that 
reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, the manager of the cooperative firm can devote more effort to organiza-
tional activity, which increases the efficiency of the production process. Hence, in terms of working effort, go-
vernance in the cooperative firm is more efficient than in the capitalist firm. 
However, an opposite result holds true for the purchasing cost of capital in the two kinds of firms. The analy-
sis of this problem represents the less developed part of the model. Given that every worker of the cooperative 
firm can become a member only through buying a share of the capital on the market, it follows that his financial 
effort has to be remunerated with greater utility related to his working activity or drawbacks from profits made 
by the firm. Therefore, the financial constraints to the purchase of K reduce the production efficiency that the 
cooperative firm would achieve, if only managerial monitoring and the consequent organizing effort are consi-
dered. Moreover, the capital constraints represent an obstacle to achieving an optimal rate of long-term growth 
for the cooperative firm. It also dampens benefits related to the virtuous circle between increases in the level of 
employment and growth rate. Such inefficiencies and constraints are not present in the capitalist firm, even con-
sidering the opportunity cost to the entrepreneur from making the capital stock K available, which is in line with 
pursuing the objective of profit maximization.  
The conclusion is that our model does not allow us to determine which of the two types of firms has the most 
efficient governance and organization. To achieve a more precise overall result, the model should be extended to 
analyze the financial aspects of the two firms and generalize the monitoring scheme. This extension and genera-
lization would require complex descriptive and analytical work, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Our 
intention is, however, tore-open the academic debate on fundamental topics such as ownership, control, and go-
vernance and to focus attention on important but less explored concepts such as the “social consciousness”, 
which seem, in certain economic organizations, to be a significant force driving investment and maximization 
decisions. 
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